Following years of growing concerns over Irans nuclear intentions, the crisis has now moved to a new and more dangerous level. After months of stalemate on the diplomatic front, and as the public statements, pronouncements and mind games have been ratcheted up, we have now seen dramatic statements on the military front by both Israel and Iran.
On July 9 Iran grabbed the headlines by claiming to have test-launched a set of Shahab-3 missiles, which they claim have a range of some 2,000km (1,240 miles) that would put all of Israel in its reach in addition to state-of-the-art shore-to-sea, surface-to-surface and sea-to-air missiles.
The test was a clear and provocative move designed to demonstrate Irans military prowess and its resolve not to bend to Israeli and US pressure. It had followed a much publicised Israeli Air Force exercise over the Mediterranean and Greece in the first week of June, in which more than 100 Israeli F-16 and F-15 fighters took part, which has been widely interpreted as a practice run (actual, or for the purposes of sending a message) of a possible future attack on Iran.
ISRAELI RESPONSE
Israel responded to the missile tests the following day by displaying two of its own military assets that have been specifically developed or adapted with Iran in mind.
The Israeli Air Force put on display its Eitam aircraft that it announced had sophisticated and unprecedented ability to spy on Iran, while also inviting the press to view a squadron of adapted F16-I fighter aircraft that now have the range to reach Iran. And, in an unusual mood, showing the gravity of the current situation, it even allowed the pilots of these aircraft, their faces partially hidden by their flying helmets, to give interviews to Israeli TV channels stating that they are ready and able to respond to any threats Israel may face.
Defence Minister Ehud Barak, speaking in Tel Aviv on July 10, sought to remind all that Israel had proved in the past that it wont hesitate to act when its vital security interests are at stake, but was also keen to emphasise, Currently the focus is international sanctions and vigorous diplomatic activity, and these avenues should be exhausted.
Yet wild speculation and conspiracy theory continues to permeate global media reports, hardly helping to downplay tensions. For example, on Friday evening both the IDF and the Iraqi government were required to dismiss earlier reports claiming that Israeli jets have been training in Iraq ahead of a possible strike on Iran. Iraqs Defense Ministry denied any drills had taken place in its airspace. We havent observed any IAF warplanes practising in Iraqi airspace, an Iraqi spokesman said. An Israeli military spokesman called the report utterly baseless.
THE MEDIA WAR
As serious as these developments are, Irans carefully orchestrated publicity surrounding the tests quickly turned into farce when it emerged that photos released to the press had been doctored, almost certainly to cover-up the fact that one of the rockets had in fact failed to fire.
The image, disseminated by the AFP news agency and reproduced by media organisations around the world, was obtained on the day of the tests from the website of Sepah News, the media arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
The next day the Associated Press distributed a nearly identical photo from the same source, but without the fourth missile, resulting in AFP then issuing a warning to its clients regarding the original image sent. The BBC News websites picture editor, Phil Coomes, told the BBC website, … it can be seen that parts have been edited, with smoke trails and parts of the foreground being cloned.
Defence analyst Mark Fitzpatrick of the UK based International Institute for Strategic Studies, in an interview with AFP, cast doubt not just on the images released, but also on some of the factual claims Iran had made regarding the test.
It very much does appear that Iran doctored the photo to cover up what apparently was a misfiring of one of the missiles … Iran both exaggerated the capabilities of the missile in their prose and apparently doctored the photos as well.
Israeli experts cast similar doubts. Uzi Rubin, for example, who was a programme director of Homa, which developed the Israeli Arrow anti-missile system, told Haaretz that he is convinced that the projectile tested was not a new version of the Iranian ballistic missile.
From what I saw, this is an old version of the Shahab-3, and contrary to their claims, it is not capable of reaching 2,000 km only 1,300 km.
Despite much of this media hype surrounding recent developments, the two most serious potential scenarios remain distant Iran is not on the verge of developing its nuclear weapon, and thus neither Israel, the USA or any other actor is on the verge of launching an attack on Irans facilities.
This, however, does not in any way diminish the gravity of the crisis Iran continues to develop its nuclear programme, and if this does not change, then military action by one actor or another will follow at some point. For the threat posed by Irans possession of an offensive nuclear capability is not purely from the fact that they might use it rather, as I will now describe, as great a threat (short- and long-term) is posed by Iran having it and not using it.
IRANIAN INTERESTS …
Irans intentions are notoriously difficult to discern and this is part of the problem. Rather than being and acting as a single-minded, cohesive (and extreme/radical) mind, Irans leadership as much since Mahmud Ahmadinejad came to power as before is regularly divided, indeed in significant disagreement, over state policy.
Some within the regime seek political isolation from the outside world, others advocate pro-actively challenging global US hegemony, the moderate Sunni Arab regimes and Israel, while others still advocate a more pragmatic approach involving positive engagement with the outside world and avoiding allowing Iran to be externally characterised as a rogue state.
Yet who falls into which camp does not fit Western stereotypes. Some of the isolationists, as well as some of the socalled Reformers/Moderates, are amongst the strongest advocates of Iran building The Bomb, while some of the clerical establishment have publicly bemoaned the growing crisis over the matter and argue that the governments dogmatic stance on the issue is harming Iranian interests.
President Ahmadinejad seen in the West as an Islamist totally in tune with the Ayatollahs who control Iran has in fact annoyed many leading clerical figures with his aggressive public pronouncements, for creating a view in international circles that Iran is to be mistrusted or feared, and for introducing certain internal political reforms not dissimilar to those introduced by former Reformist-orientated presidents.
Criticisms are being expressed more and more openly by some elements for government policy and actions being too aggressive and intransigent, and from other elements (including powerful elements like the Revolutionary Guards) for not being aggressive enough!
TEHRAN LOGIC
Amid this complex and contradictory picture coming out of Iran, what does seem clear is that those in the regime, who are determined to acquire an independent nuclear capability, wish to do so to ensure something that is also sought by many of the Reformers/Moderates growing Iranian power and influence in the region and the world.
For, contrary to an assumption held in certain quarters, there is nothing to suggest that Iran has an apocalyptic agenda. While there is little doubt that they seek Israels dissolution or destruction, Iran has no practical, ideological or theological interest in doing so in a manner that would result in their own destruction too.
While a particular brand of radical Shiite Islamists is certainly an important aspect of the Iranian regimes self-identity and policy priorities, Iran should not be confused with extreme militant Islamist elements like al Qaeda. Al Qaeda do have just such an apocalyptic agenda, intent as they are in inflicting mass casualties on as large a scale as they are able. They thus have no hesitation in using a nuclear device if they could acquire one not least because there would be nowhere for the country targeted to fire their response at.
Iran, a sovereign state far more interested in continuing to exist and prosper, and to strengthening its regional and global standing, has very different priorities, and participation in a nuclear war with Israel, that would certainly result in its destruction, is thus not in its interests. Quite the opposite, Irans express interest is in forging a reality in which they can help defeat and destroy Israel in a manner that also ensures that they themselves thrive and grow.
Having The Nuke could play a huge role in achieving such an end, especially in the current political climate for Iran is determined to remove itself from the Regime Change paradigm, to ensure that what the USA and its allies did to Iraq and Saddam Hussein can never be done to it.
Iran is all too aware of the reality that one of the reasons why the US chose to take military action against Iraq when they decided to act against rogue states after 9/11 was because Saddam did not yet have The Bomb, and that similar action against North Korea was not feasible because they do have The Bomb.
The US simply could not take such action against a state possessing the capacity to drop a nuclear weapon on its front-line troops, its interests in the region, or its allies.
NUCLEAR WEAPON AS TOOL FOR CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT?
But this is not the full story for once this objective is achieved, so is a second, that is equally essential to any future Iranian engagement with Israel : relative strategic parity with the Jewish State and thus the ability to launch conventional forces on Israel without fear of nuclear attack.
The logic behind this is simple if two enemies have The Nuke, then in effect neither has it; for one side cannot use it without the guarantee of the other side responding in kind, with both being decimated in the process.
Thus, with both Israel and Iran having The Bomb, suddenly there would be a very real potential for dramatic Iranian activity on the conventional military front, Iran knowing that even in a worst case scenario Israel could not utilise their nuclear capability, because an equivalent response would be inevitable.
Iran would, in such a reality, be free to initiate or support ever increasing levels of conventional warfare against Israel, directly or via their proxies. Willing partners like Hizbollah could be let off the leash given even greater military assistance than at present, and encouraged to wage war on Israel with Iran likely to also encourage and assist in similar action from the ever willing Hamas.
This would amount to almost as serious an existential threat to Israeli and regional security as Iran threatening nuclear war. If in a couple of years Iran were to have a Nuke it would be a new, untried device carried by delivery systems not before tested in the field, approaching an Israel with a very strong capability to intercept them. Iran would have little or nothing it could do to shoot down any Israel response that would be delivered by long-since tried and proven systems. Irans ability to attack Israel with a nuclear device would thus be limited; yet its ability to pursue this conventional approach would have been massively enhanced, for the reasons described.
Israel cannot and will not take for granted the fact that Iran would not be seeking to use a nuclear weapon if they did acquire one, and will strategise for the worst case scenario and this will undoubtedly involve its establishing key Red Lines, which if crossed could initiate a military response of some kind.
Those Red Lines will not be crossed any time soon, yet are approaching all too fast. The key question thus is whether Iran is determined to reach this point, or whether it will pull back from the abyss when it becomes clear that a confrontation is inevitable. Worryingly, for now, it is impossible to provide an informed answer to that question most worryingly, this is because the Iranians themselves may not know. This most dangerous game thus continues.
